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A recently proposed model of social interaction in voting is investigated by simplifying it down
into a version that is more analytically tractable and which allows a mathematical analysis to be
performed. This analysis clarifies the interplay of the different elements present in the system —
social influence, heterogeneity and noise — and leads to a better understanding of its properties.
The origin of a regime of bistability is identified. The insight gained in this way gives further
intuition into the behaviour of the original model.
PACS numbers:
1 Introduction
There is a growing appreciation of the importance of
social influence in voting [1–3], and convincing experi-
mental evidence of the phenomenon has recently been
produced [4, 5]. However, a detailed understanding of
the process and its implications is still lacking. Systems
of interacting elements can display complex, sometimes
counter-intuitive, behaviour [6], making mathematical
analysis highly useful to understand the properties of
such systems.
There are already a number of studies modelling voting
as a social influence process, for example [7–14]. These
tend to consider rather simple models that intend to cap-
ture, in a stylised manner, some aspects of the voting
process or to reproduce some observed regularity. A dif-
ferent approach was taken in Refs. [15, 16], where a col-
laboration between social scientists and computational
modellers led to the creation of a complex computational
model of voter turnout. There is a tendency for the for-
mer approach to be taken by physicists, who have a tra-
dition of gaining intuition through the use of simple mod-
els in their own subject. On the other hand, the latter
approach is frequently favoured by social scientists, who
wish to include all aspects which they feel may have an
influence on the system. This difference in approach has
the unfortunate consequence of leading to the formation
of two groups of modellers whose models have little in
common, and who have little incentive to communicate.
In a previous paper [17], we started to address this
issue by forming a bridge between the two methodolo-
gies. This consisted of constructing an intermediate
model which was between the two types described above.
The philosophy behind this is discussed in some detail in
Ref. [17], but we had several goals in mind. One was
simply to attempt to bring together the two communi-
ties described above, by formulating a model which had
features of both perspectives. Another was to develop
the methodology of forming such intermediate models.
The actual procedure we adopted in constructing the
new model consisted, very broadly, of beginning from
the complex model of Refs. [15, 16], and systematically
eliminating certain features which did not have a marked
effect on the outcomes of simulations.
We would not necessarily expect that a single inter-
mediate model would be able to bridge the large gap
between complex models and the models favoured by
physicists, and therefore we instead envisage there being
a sequence of intermediate models, each less complicated
than the previous one, while retaining sufficient features
in common with its ‘neighbours’ in the model sequence,
that any similarities and differences between them can
be systematically studied and the reasons behind these
understood. In the context of models of voter turnout
which interest us here, we will denote the most complex
model of Refs. [15, 16] as Model 1 and the simplified ver-
sion of this model discussed in Ref. [17] as Model 2. The
purpose of this paper is to create a further model in the
sequence, denoted as Model 3, which comes near to being
a model of the type preferred by physicists, in that it is
sufficiently simple to allow some mathematical analysis.
The method used to reduce the model complexity also
uncovered a number of phenomena which were difficult to
detect in Model 1 (simply because of its sheer complex-
ity), and revealed several mechanisms required for these
phenomena to be observed. One such phenomenon was
the existence of a single control parameter (the ‘influence
rate’) that largely controlled the levels of voter turnout
in the model. When the influence rate was low, simu-
lations of Model 2 always resulted in low voter turnout.
Conversely for large influence rates, voter turnout was al-
ways high. For intermediate values of the influence rate,
the reduced model displayed bistability, so that different
runs of the same model with the same parameters and
initial conditions could, by chance, give either a high or
a low turnout. The construction of the further simplified
Model 3 should allow us to gain a deeper understanding
of this phenomenon.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2,
we first give an overview of the differences between the
previous two models (more detail is given in the Appen-
dices), describe the new model (Model 3) and then give
the results of simulation which show that the predictions
of Model 2 and Model 3 are qualitatively similar. Having
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2established this essential requirement of Model 3, we go
on to mathematically analyse it in Section 3. We con-
clude in Section 4 with a summary and a look to the
future.
2 Formulation
Model 1 is a complex agent-based computational model
of voting, developed to incorporate the evidence sug-
gested in the social science literature. This model de-
scribes the inhabitants of a neighbourhood or small city,
and consists of a population of agents that occupy the
sites of a square lattice, with sites corresponding to
houses, workplaces, schools and other places of activity.
The agents have a large number of characteristics (in-
cluding age, ethnicity, interest in politics and ‘civic duty’)
and are subjected to many processes (including ageing,
moving house, finding jobs and having children). These
processes modify some of the agents’ characteristics and
allow them to make links to other agents, creating a social
network. Agents also initiate (political) conversations
over this social network, with a probability that depends
on their political interest. In turn, the conversations they
receive affect their political interest and allow civic duty
to spread between agents. Agents’ civic duty (together
with other elements) determines their propensity to vote
in a series of periodic elections. Agents can leave the
simulation by dying or emigrating and new agents are
created via births and immigration. The details of the
model can be found in [15, 16]. A schematic representa-
tion of the model is given in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: Diagrammatic representation of the complex
model. The main pathway is shown in blue, with additional
factors in red, and general development of the agent popula-
tion in green.
In a recent work, Model 1 was distilled into the more
compact Model 2. By neglecting some of the more com-
plicated components of Model 1, Model 2 allowed us
to investigate the effects of different mechanisms, and
to explore the parameter space in a more efficient way.
A major simplification of Model 2 was ignoring all pro-
cesses that form links between agents, setting instead a
social network with appropriate characteristics. Other
elements, such as those regarding party preference and
development of children, were also neglected. Model 2
achieved a large simplification (of the order of a factor
1000 in computational efficiency [17]) whilst maintaining
good agreement with Model 1. A detailed description of
the relatively complex Model 2 is given in Appendix A.
In this section we will push the model-analysis process
forward. We will start by formulating Model 3, a simpler
version of Model 2 that is more suitable for mathematical
analysis. Some of the simplifications we will make will
involve formulating processes in a more standard form
so that checking the output of these against those from
Model 2 enables us to draw conclusions that are robust
with respect to the implementation details.
In Model 2, social influence (the key mechanism in the
model) is implemented using two main variables: inter-
est level and number of conversations remembered. The
interest level determines the propensity of an agent to
initiate conversations. In turn, the interest level of an
agent is determined by the number of their received con-
versations (together with their minimum interest level).
Conversations are forgotten with some probability every
year. A further complication is that agents with zero in-
terest level have different dynamics, until their number of
‘background’ conversations remembered exceeds a given
threshold (see Appendix A for details).
We will simplify Model 2 in three main ways to create
Model 3. Firstly we will use the same dynamics for all
interest levels (thus ignoring the difference in Model 2 for
agents with interest level zero). In addition, we will use a
single variable for the influence process, which we call the
‘interest state’, that increases with each received conver-
sation and decreases appropriately, rather than one vari-
able for interest level and a different one for conversations
remembered. Moreover, we will uncouple the dynamics
of the interest state from that of voting. While in Model 2
agent’s voting behaviour affects their probability to initi-
ate conversations (turnout-conversations feedback in Fig.
1), this feedback will be neglected in Model 3.
This formulation is more suitable for mathematical
analysis and will allow us to see the interplay of the dif-
ferent elements of the model in a more transparent way.
We define Model 3 below.
2.1 Model 3 definition
The model consists of a population of N agents.
Agents enter and leave the model via immigration-
emigration and birth-death. For simplicity we keep the
population size constant, by matching each death event
by a birth and every emigration by an immigration.
Agents age throughout the simulation and their age de-
termines their death probability. The ith agent is char-
acterized by three dynamic variables: (political) interest
state, s(i); civic duty, d(i); and voting habit, h(i). In
addition, agents have two fixed characteristics: their ‘in-
trinsic interest’ state, m(i); and their level of education,
ed(i). The interest state, s(i), is the primary dynamic
variable in the model, controlling how often the agent
initiates conversations, and depending on the number of
received conversations. Civic duty, d(i), (spread through
conversations) and voting habit, h(i), are binary vari-
3ables that together determine the probability of an agent
voting. Finally, the intrinsic interest state determines the
minimum value that the interest state variable may take
for that agent, and the education modulates the proba-
bilities of acquiring or losing civic duty.
We now describe the model dynamics.
(i) At each time step each agent initiates
Bin(K, f(s(i),m(i))) conversations [25], where
Bin(N, p) is a Binomial random variable for the
number of successes from N trials, each with
probability p of success.
(ii) For each successful conversation another agent, j,
is picked at random (corresponding to a fully con-
nected underlying network) and the receiving agent
increases their interest state [s(j)→ s(j)+1]. Con-
versations can lead to the spread of civic duty in the
following way. If a conversation takes place from
an agent, i, with civic duty to an agent, j, without
it, and agent j’s interest state is larger than some
threshold, s(j) ≥ Td, then they gain civic duty with
probability, ad, dependent on whether they voted
in the last election.
(iii) Each time step, after all conversations are com-
pleted, every agent has a probability [s(i)−m(i)]γ
to decrease their interest state by one. Thus in the
absence of received conversations an agent’s inter-
est state will decay to their intrinsic interest state
over a time-scale of order 1/γ. In addition, agents
lose civic duty with a probability ld so that civic
duty decays over a time-scale of order 1/ld (typi-
cally ld  γ).
(iv) Elections take place with periodicity τe. An agent
will vote with probability (1-pc) if they have civic
duty or voting habit, and will otherwise not vote.
Here pc is the probability of not voting, despite
having the intention to vote, due to “confounding
factors”, for instance illness or having recently lost
employment. An agent voting in three consecutive
elections acquires voting habit, and loses this habit
if they fail to vote in two consecutive elections.
We focus mainly on a fully connected underlying net-
work to ease the analysis. By initially ignoring network
effects we can better understand the main properties of
the model. Network effects are considered at the end of
Section 3.
2.2 Comparing Model 2 and Model 3
Model 2 (with an underlying fully connected network)
and Model 3 outputs are compared in Fig. 2. For each
value of the influence rate, K, we show 25 different time
series from 0 to 200 years, corresponding to different re-
alisations of the process. Due to the non-standard na-
ture of this figure, we stress again that each of the ten
collection of points that is seen in the figures represent
time series running from 0 to 200 years. We can see that
FIG. 2: Comparing the results for Model 2 (red circles) and
Model 3 (blue pluses), in turnout (top figure) and number of
conversations per year per agent (bottom, in log-scale to ap-
preciate the low-conversations regime better). For each value
of K (the influence rate), we plot 25 time series from 0 to 200
years. Here c = 3 and other parameter values are given in
Appendix B.
there are essentially two regimes, one with a small num-
ber of conversations and low turnout, obtained for low
values of influence rate, and another with a large num-
ber of conversations and high turnout, for higher values
of the influence rate. These two regimes are connected
by a region of bistability, in which, for the same param-
eter values and initial conditions, some realisations con-
verge to the ‘high-communication’ regime and some to
the ‘low-communication’ one (which regime is achieved
is a random outcome arising from the stochasticity of
the process). We note that the results are similar when
plotting the variables civic duty or voting habit.
We can also see from Fig. 2 that results of Model 3
and Model 2 show good agreement. The number of con-
versations are very close for the two models. The main
difference between the two models is that Model 3 gives a
slightly smaller voter turnout. In the low-communication
4regime, this is primarily due to the simplifying assump-
tion in Model 3 that individuals with zero interest state
follow the same dynamics as those with higher interest
states (which is not the case in Model 2). This leads to
a smaller number of agents being susceptible to acquir-
ing civic duty. In the high-communication regime, the
difference in turnout is mainly due to the assumption in
Model 3 that the probability, pc, of an agent not voting
in spite of having civic duty or voting habit, does not
depend on age. In contrast in Model 2, the probability
of an agent with civic duty or voting habit not voting
is smaller for younger agents, so that agents in Model 2
are slightly more likely to build habit, leading to higher
levels of voting (the aforementioned zero-interest effect
is less important in this regime because almost no agent
has interest state equal to zero). This explanation is
confirmed by simulations which include these elements.
Despite these small quantitative differences, Model 2 and
Model 3 are qualitatively very similar.
3 Analysis
We would like to understand the origin of the low- and
high-communication regimes and the bistability region,
as well as the mechanisms required to observe these fea-
tures. In order to do so, we will perform a general math-
ematical analysis of Model 3. Because the interest state
dynamics is unaffected by the voting dynamics and yet
interest and voting are closely correlated, we conclude
that the interest state dynamics is the main driver of the
system, and will focus our analysis on the interest state
dynamics.
The process is a discrete-time analogue of the follow-
ing system of continuous-time birth and death stochastic
processes:
s(i)
β−→ s(i) + 1, s(i) δi−→ s(i)− 1, (1)
with β ≡ K∑j f(s(j),m(j))/N and δi ≡ [s(i) −m(i)]γ
(note that if s(i) ≥ m(i) initially then δi is always pos-
itive). We will analyse this continuous-time version for
mathematical convenience.
In order to make analytical progress, we will assume
that β is time-independent. This is suggested by apply-
ing the central limit theorem, since β is the sum of N
independent random variables divided by N (the central
limit theorem does not strictly apply here, since the s(j)
variables are not independent, so the time-independence
of β is an assumption), and it is supported by numerical
simulations with large N . With the constant β assump-
tion, (1) implies that the variables s(i)−m(i) follow in-
dependent linear birth and death processes. At steady
state, we have [18]:
s(i) = m(i) + Poissoni(λ), (2)
where λ ≡ β/γ, and Poissonj(λ) are Poisson random
variables with mean λ (independent for different values
of j).
Under the constant λ assumption, inserting Eq. (2) in
the definition of λ, we obtain the following self-consistent
equation:
λ =
K
γ
∑
j
f(m(j) + Poissonj(λ),m(j))
N
. (3)
We can re-write the sum in (3) grouping agents with the
same value of the minimum interest state, m:
N∑
j=1
f(m(j) + Poissonj(λ),m(j)) =∑
m
∑
α∈Am
f(m+ Poissonα(λ),m), (4)
with Am equal to the set of indices of agents that have
intrinsic state equal to m, Am = {j|m(j) = m}. Assum-
ing that Am is large for every m (i.e. there are many
agents of each type) or, equivalently, disregarding fluc-
tuations,
∑
α∈Am f(m + Poissonα(λ)) is just an average
over a Poisson distribution with mean λ,∑
α∈Am
f(m+ Poissonα(λ),m) ≈ |Am|〈f(m+ n,m);λ〉,
(5)
where 〈;λ〉 indicates an average over a Poisson distri-
bution with mean λ, and |Am| denotes the number of
elements in the set Am, |Am| = NP (m), with P (m) the
fraction of agents with intrinsic interest state equal to m.
Making this approximation, Eq. (3) leads to:
γ
K
λ =
∑
m
P (m)〈f(m+ n,m);λ〉 ≡ g(λ). (6)
Equation (6) displays the key elements in the system and
it is the main result of this section. The social inter-
action appears through the function f , the heterogene-
ity in the population via the average over the distribu-
tion of m, P (m), and the intrinsic stochasticity through
the average over the Poisson distribution. The form of
the equation depends on the mean-field-type of inter-
action (equivalently, fully connected social network) as-
sumed. The equation shows how the interaction function,
f , smoothed out by the heterogeneity and stochasticity,
determines the number and type of solutions as K/γ is
varied.
In order to gain some intuition into the properties of
Eq. (6), we will analyse it in the particular case in which
f(s,m) has the form used in Model 2 (see Appendix A).
The formula for g(λ) corresponding to this case is given
in Appendix B, and it is illustrated in Fig. 3.
We see that g(λ) displays an S-shape, starting at a
small value for λ = 0, increasing for intermediate values
of λ and saturating for larger values of λ. The value of
g(λ) at λ = 0 is related to the amount of conversations
that take place even when social influence is absent (due
to agents with large intrinsic interest), while the value of
5λ
0 10 20 30
g(λ
)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
FIG. 3: Right-hand side of Eq. (6) (solid line) and left-hand
side for K = 2 (dashed), K = 4 (dot-dashed) and K = 16
(dotted), for c = 3 and other parameter values as in Ap-
pendix B. Between K = 2.8 and K = 10.4 the self-consistent
equation (6) has three solutions.
g(λ) for large λ corresponds to the amount of conversa-
tions when all the agents have their maximum possible
interest (due to large social influence). The position and
sharpness of the increase depends on the form of f as
well as on the distribution of m. The sharper f is, and
the more homogeneous the population, the sharper the
increase in g(λ). We see that bistability is possible if
g(λ) increases relatively sharply, which corresponds to
a sharply increasing f and a homogeneous population,
and if limλ→∞ g(λ)− g(0) is large (compared with g(0)),
which corresponds to the case in which social influence
has a strong impact on the overall conversation levels.
This prediction is confirmed by numerical simulations of
Model 3, as well as of Model 2 and Model 1, illustrating
how the analysis of the simpler Model 3 can generate im-
portant insights into the behaviour of the more complex
Model 1.
In Fig. 4 the solutions of Eq. (6) are compared with
numerical simulations, showing good agreement.
Fig. 3 illustrates how for large values of γ/K there is
only one solution of Eq. (6). As γ/K decreases, the line
(λ/K)γ becomes tangent to the right-hand side of (6),
giving rise to two new solutions through a saddle-node
bifurcation. As γ/K decreases further, a new tangent
condition is obtained, leading to the disappearance of
two of the solutions through another saddle-node bifur-
cation. Imposing Eq. (6) together with the equality of
the derivatives leads to:
λ =
g(λ)
g′(λ)
, (7)
K =
γ
g′(λ)
. (8)
Solving Eq. (7) and using Eq. (8) we can derive the values
of K and λ for which the bifurcations take place, delimit-
ing the region of parameter space where bistability is pos-
sible. The results of this exercise are presented in Fig. 5,
FIG. 4: Number of conversations per agent per year as a
function of parameter K, for c = 3 and year t = 200. Error
bars correspond to two standard deviations. The red crosses
correspond to runs in which the initial population had a low
interest state while the blue diamonds correspond to runs
with high initial interest. The simulations show a region of
bistability between K = 4 and K = 9.
together with results coming from numerical simulations
of the model. The x-axis of this figure (c) is a parameter
that determines the shape of g(λ) (see Appendix B for
its definition). The simulation-based results correspond-
ing to the lower transition were determined as the min-
imum value of K for which some realisations reach the
high-communication regime, taking as initial condition a
population with the maximum interest state; the results
corresponding to the upper transition were determined
as the maximum value of K for which some realisations
stay in the low-communication regime, taking as initial
condition a population with the minimum interest state.
We see that, for reasonably large values of c, the bista-
bility disappears much sooner in the simulations than in
the theoretical predictions. This might be due to the fact
that, while, in the deterministic limit, the solution corre-
sponding to the low-communication regime still exists, its
relative stability (and its basin of attraction) is low and
the noise pushes the system to the ‘high-communication’
solution. This particularly simple bifurcation diagram is
obtained when the function f used is taken to approxi-
mate Model 2 (see Appendix B). For more general forms
of the function f a more complex bifurcation diagram is
possible.
It is interesting to compare Model 3 with other mod-
els of social influence. Threshold models of collective
behaviour [19, 20] form probably the simplest class of
models showing similar phenomenology. In these mod-
els, an agent participates in an activity if some propor-
tion of the population (the agent’s threshold) also does
so. Bistability can appear when the population is ho-
mogeneous (the threshold distribution is sharply peaked
around a given value). Our model is similar to this class
6FIG. 5: Bistability region in the K − c plane. Bistability is
observed for values of K between the symbols. Theoretical
predictions are displayed as solid lines.
in that different agents require different amounts of social
input in order to show the same level of activity (due to
different intrinsic interests, m). The random-field Ising
model [21], which can also be used to model social phe-
nomena [11, 22, 23], shows similar phenomenology, with
multi-stability arising for small disorder and low noise. In
this case, the local fields of the random-field Ising model
would correspond to intrinsic interest of our model. The
key ingredients of all these models are a heterogeneous
population and a nonlinear influence function.
So far we have assumed a fully connected interaction
network. The results can, however, change qualitatively
when a different type of interaction network is used. The
effects of the network in Model 3 are the same as those
obtained for Model 2 [17]. The main result is that the
bistability region can disappear, with the relevant vari-
ables increasing in a smoother way, when the interaction
network becomes sparse or strongly clustered. This effect
is reminiscent of that found in random field Ising models
in which sparser networks tend to require higher inter-
action strength for bistability to occur [23]. From the
perspective of our analysis, adding a network leads to
conversation inputs that fluctuate more between agents.
This results in an extra source of heterogeneity in the
equation for λ (that in this case should be replaced by
λ ≡∑λi/N) that further smooths the interaction func-
tion f , which results in a smaller region of parameter
space in which bistability occurs. We note that since we
expect real systems to be heterogeneous this result sug-
gest that bistability may not be widespread in real-world
systems.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have demonstrated the power of a
method of model reduction involving generating a chain
of increasingly simpler models. Beginning from a com-
plex model (Model 1), and a previously published re-
duced model (Model 2), we have created a further re-
duced model (Model 3) and shown that it agrees quan-
titatively and qualitatively with Model 2. Since the re-
lationship of Model 2 to Model 1 has been previously
investigated, we thus have a clear link between results
derived and understood in Model 3 to equivalent effects
found in the original complex model, which in turn ex-
plicitly models mechanisms believed to be important in
real world voting processes.
We have described some advantages of this approach
in the Introduction, but one of the most compelling is
that it combines the best of two worlds: the simplicity
appreciated by those trained in the physical sciences, but
having an input from the many effects included in com-
plex models. A central point is that, although the models
constructed through this procedure are ‘simple’, in the
sense that they have far fewer parameters than the mod-
els they are derived from and are more amenable to anal-
ysis, they will typically have features that would not have
been guessed at if one started from simple models and
then added further complexity. This is the strength of
the approach: Model 1 contains within it a large amount
of social science data and expertise, and a diluted form
of this is retained in Model 3.
A direct translation of the methods used in physics
would be to start with a minimal model, progressively
introducing new structure and at every stage comparing
the new model with data. We believe that the process we
have described here is more directly suited to the social
sciences, with its relative paucity of data. However the
conventional physical sciences approach can still have a
role after the various stages of models have been created.
One could also attempt to go from Model n to Model
(n− 1), and in this way explore a wide range of possible
models by going up and down the various stages. In this
way one should be able to gain a fuller appreciation of
the role that various extra structures have in giving a
more complete description of the system.
To demonstrate the utility of creating a model that is
amenable to mathematical analysis we have used Model 3
to investigate the origins of the bistability seen in Model
2, and the existence of high and low turnout regimes
found in both Model 2 and Model 1. This investigation
allowed us to understand the mechanisms required for
bistability to exist, and provided an explanation for the
observed dependence on the homogeneity of the popu-
lation and the structure of the social network when one
is used. This was a specific illustration of the use of
this method in models of voter turnout, but we believe
that the present approach of using a chain of increasingly
simple models can be fruitful for the analysis of a wide
variety of complex systems.
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Appendix A: Description of Model 2
The description of Model 2 can be found in [17]; we give it
here for completeness.
Each agent (with index i = 1, . . . , N) has the following list
of characteristics, some of which can change over time:
binary variables: civic duty (cd(i)), turnout (in last
election, v(i)), voting habit (h(i)), post-18 education
(ed(i))
integer variables: (political) interest level (l(i)), min-
imum interest level (m(i)), age (in years, a(i)), number
of (political) conversations remembered (c(i))
The main parameters of the model are:
Influence rate K, which scales the number of (political) con-
versations per year.
Probabilities of initiating a conversation pc(l, v).
Probabilities of gaining and losing civic duty pacd(e, v) and
plcd(e, v, a), respectively.
Thresholds on the number of conversations needed to increase
the interest level Tα.
Probability of forgetting a conversation pf (l).
Death probability pd(a).
Emigration probability pe.
Probability of not voting due to confounding factors pc(a).
1. Initialisation procedures
Agents are initialised using data derived from the British
Household Panel Study (BPS) [24]. The same procedure ini-
tialises immigrants into the model, using the subset of the
BHPS corresponding to survey responses from immigrants.
This procedure sets the civic duty, turnout, voting habit,
post-18 education, interest level and minimum interest level,
with some of these characteristics being inferred using proxies
for the required information. Agents initially do not remem-
ber any conversations, and have an age drawn from a uni-
form distribution between 18 and 70 (to initialise the model)
and between 18 and 48 (for later immigrants into the model).
Agents born into the simulation have age 18 (they are only
taken into account in the model when they are adults), and
education with probability 0.3. Their interest level and min-
imum interest level is equal to their education, and they are
assumed have no civic duty, voting habit or conversations re-
membered and not to have voted in the last election.
2. Main loop
The following processes happen in a loop until the required
time-point is reached. All rates are given in Table I below.
Each year:
Each month:
Carrying out conversations: For each agent,
this section is run bK/12c times plus one time
extra with probability K/12− bK/12c.
The agent has the chance to initiate three
conversations, with probabilities pc(l(i), v(i))
each with a random other agent.
Agents (with l(i) > 0) receiving a conversa-
tion (from an agent with civic duty), acquire
civic duty with probability pacd(ed(i), v(i)).
Updating interest levels:
If l(i) = 0 and c(i) > T0 then set l(i) = 1 and
m(i) = 1.
Else, if c(i) > Th then set l(i) = m(i) + 2.
Else, if c(i) > Tl then set l(i) = m(i) + 1.
Updating civic duty: Agents lose civic duty
with probability, plcd(ed(i), v(i)), dependent on
their age and education.
Forgetting conversations: Agents forget conversa-
tions that happened more than one year ago, with prob-
ability, pf (l(i)), per conversation, dependent on the
agent’s interest level.
Birth/death: Each agent dies with a probability,
pd(a(i)), dependent on their age, and is replaced by
a new agent by the ‘birth’ process (described in Section
A 1).
Immigration/emigration: Each agent emigrates
with a probability pe = 0.015 and is replaced by a
new agent by the ‘immigration’ process (described in
Section A 1).
Ageing: Agents age by one year.
Every 5 years there is an election:
Agents with civic duty or voting habit vote unless ‘con-
founded’ (due to illness or other factors) with probabil-
ity pc(a(i)), dependent on their age.
Agents gain voting habit if they vote in 3 consecutive
elections.
Agents lose voting habit if they do not vote in 2 con-
secutive elections.
Here bxc denotes the integer part of x, that is, the largest
integer no greater than x.
Appendix B: Parameters for Model 3
In the main text, Model 3 has been defined in rather gen-
eral terms. In order to correspond to Model 2 as described in
Appendix A, it is necessary to make the following identifica-
tions:
The social interaction function f has to take the following
piece-wise constant form:
f(s,m) =

0, if s < 2c.
0.322 ≡ f1, if 2c ≤ s < 3c.
0.794 ≡ f2, if 3c ≤ s < 4c.
0.794 ≡ f2, if s ≥ 4c and m < 2c.
1.397 ≡ f3, if s ≥ 4c and m ≥ 2c.
(B1)
8These numbers are taken directly from Model 2, except for the
following approximation. In Model 2 the f(s,m) is affected
by whether or not the agent voted in the previous election.
This link is broken in Model 3. In order to have comparable
values for f , we choose the ones corresponding to Model 2,
assuming that the agent voted with a probability of 0.86. This
is approximately equal to the proportion of agents voting in
the high-communication regime (we expect it to work as well
on the low-communication regime because the few agents that
initiate conversations in that regime are also likely to have
voted).
The probability of acquiring and losing civic duty is given
by:
ad =

0.258, if v(i) = ed(i) = 0.
0.51, if v(i) = 1, ed(i) = 0 or v(i) = 0, ed(i) = 1.
1, if ed(i) = v(i) = 1.
(B2)
ld =
{
0.000417, if ed(i) = 0.
0.00083, else.
(B3)
Other parameter values are γ = 0.0167 month−1, Td = c,
pc = 0.139, τe = 5 years. The total number of individuals is
N = 500. Also c = 3 unless otherwise stated.
Individuals born in the simulation are initiated with 18 years
of age (we do not explicitly include children), with: ed(i) =
B(0.34),m(i) = c · ed(i), v(i) = h(i) = d(i) = 0.
The characteristics of immigrants are set based on statis-
tics derived from the British Household Panel Study
[24], as follows: m(i) = 3c, 2c, c, 0, with probabilities
0.02, 0.06, 0.21, 0.71, respectively.
If m(i) = 3c, then s(i) = 4c, ed(i) = d(i) = 1, v(i) =
B(0.9), h(i) = B(0.29).
If m(i) = 2c, then s(i) = 3c+B(0.32), ed(i) = B(0.68), d(i) =
B(0.43), v(i) = B(0.70), h(i) = B(0.13).
If m(i) = c, then s(i) = c, ed(i) = 1, d(i) = B(0.21), v(i) =
0.72, h(i) = B(0.13).
If m(i) = 0, then s(i) = c, ed(i) = 0, d(i) = B(0.21), v(i) =
0.72, h(i) = B(0.13).
In addition, if h(i) = v(i) = 1, with probability 0.9 it is as-
sumed that the agent voted in the election previous to the
latest one (this is relevant for the dynamics of voting habit).
Here B(x) denotes a Bernoulli random variable with mean x,
that is B(x) = 1 with probability x, B(x) = 0 else. These
parameter values are taken directly from Model 2, with no
data fitting involved.
With the form of f(s,m) given in (B1), equation (6) be-
comes:
γ
K
λ = P (0)f2 + P (1)f2 + P (2)f3 + P (3)f3
−Γ(c, λ)
Γ(c)
[P (1)f1 + P (2)(f2 − f1) + P (3)(f3 − f2)]
−Γ(2c, λ)
Γ(2c)
[P (0)f1 + P (1)(f2 − f3) + P (2)(f3 − f2)]
−Γ(3c, λ)
Γ(3c)
P (0)(f2 − f1), (B4)
where Γ(a) = Γ(a, 0) is the Gamma function, and
Γ(a, x) ≡ ∫∞
x
ta−1e−tdt is the incomplete Gamma func-
tion. Since Γ(a, x)/Γ(a) decreases monotonically with x, with
Γ(a, 0)/Γ(a) = 1,Γ(a,∞)/Γ(a) = 0,Γ(a, a)/Γ(a) ≈ 1/2 (last
approximate equality being valid for large a), we see that the
right-hand side of (B4) changes from P (2)f1+P (3)f2 for λ . 1
(when only agents with intrinsic state equal to two or three
initiate conversations) to P (0)f2 +P (1)f2 +P (2)f3 +P (3)f3
for λ & 3c (when all agents initiate conversations at the maxi-
mum possible rate given their intrinsic state). The right hand
side of (B4) typically displays an S-shape which can lead to
several solutions for λ in a range of parameter values, as il-
lustrated in Fig. 3 in the main text.
For λ c, Eq. (B4) simplifies to:
γ
K
λ ' P (2)f1 + P (3)f2 ⇒ γλ ' K[P (2)f1 + P (3)f2], (B5)
while for λ c, Eq. (B4) leads to:
γ
K
λ ' [P (0) + P (1)]f2 + [P (2) + P (3)]f3 (B6)
⇒ γλ ' K{[P (0) + P (1)]f2 + [P (2) + P (3)]f3}.
We see that both the solution with small λ and the one with
large λ, increase linearly with K. This simple approximation
breaks down for intermediate values of λ (of the order of c),
but it can be rather accurate, as evidenced by the approxi-
mately straight character of the theoretical lines in figure (4)
of the main text.
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Parameter Value Meaning
name
N 480 population size
pd(a) a function of age derived from mortality tables death rate
pe 0.015 emigration rate
K K ∈ [2, 12] influence rate
pc(l, v)
pc(2, 0) = [0.0100, 0.0500, 0.1500]
probability of initiating a conversation (pc(l, v) = [0, 0, 0] if l ≤ 1)
pc(2, 1) = [0.0600, 0.1000, 0.1800]
pc(3, 0) = [0.0600, 0.1925, 0.3795]
pc(3, 1) = [0.1540, 0.2800, 0.3900]
pc(4, 0) = [0.2000, 0.4750, 0.5134]
pc(4, 1) = [0.3232, 0.5680, 0.5370]
pacd(e, v) 1-(1-0.25(1+e)(1+v))(1-0.010(1+e)(1+v)) probability of acquiring civic duty (per conversation)
T0 5 threshold for increasing interest level to 1
Tl 2 lower threshold for increasing interest
Th 5 higher threshold for increasing interest
plcd(a, e)
0.01/(12(1 + e)) if a ≥ 25
probability (per month) of losing civic duty
0 if a < 25
pc(a)
0.077 if a ≤ 75
probability of not voting due to being confounded
0.077 + (1− 0.077)0.9(a−75)(a−74)/2 else
pf 0.2 probability (per year) of forgetting a conversation
pfb 0.5 probability (per year) of forgetting a background conversation
TABLE I: Parameter values for Model 2
